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Abstract
About ten years ago, various notions of pref-
erential entailment have been introduced. The
main reference is a paper by Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor (KLM), one of the main competitor
being a more general version defined by Makin-
son (MAK). These two versions have already
been compared, but it is time to revisit these
comparisons. Here are our three main results:
(1) These two notions are equivalent, provided
that we restrict our attention, as done in KLM,
to the cases where the entailment respects log-
ical equivalence (on the left and on the right).
(2) A serious simplification of the description of
the fundamental cases in which MAK is equiva-
lent to KLM, including a natural passage in both
ways. (3) The two previous results are given for
preferential entailments more general than con-
sidered in some of the original texts, but they ap-
ply also to the original definitions and, for this
particular case also, the models can be simplified.
1 INTRODUCTION
Here is one possible presentation of preferential entail-
ments: We are given some knowledge, represented as a set
of logical formulas. This set can be associated with various
kinds of objects, providing its “semantics”: it can be asso-
ciated with its set of models, or equivalently in the propo-
sitional case, with the set of the complete theories which
entail the formulas. Or it can be associated with the set of
theories (complete or not) which entail the formulas. Then
we are given a binary relation among these objects, and we
keep only the objects which are “preferred” (meaning min-
imal) for this relation. We get a stronger set of formulas,
deduced “by default”: we get also all the formulas associ-
ated with this reduced set of objects. This allows to reason
in a non monotonic way, since augmenting the knowledge
may invalidate previous conclusions. Indeed, some objects
may become minimal in the smaller set associated with the
new knowledge. We can allow more flexibility by consid-
ering copies of models, or copies of theories, defining the
relation among these sets of copies. We get then four kinds
of preferential entailments, called KLM below, which have
been introduced by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) in
[7] ([7] requires some conditions on the relation, but adding
these conditions is straightforward in our results).
Makinson (1994, first version in 1989) has defined a more
general version [8], called MAK here. An unstructured “se-
mantics” is defined simply by a satisfaction relation from
some set of objects to the set of formulas, without any con-
dition. It is then useless to consider sets of these objects
instead of singletons: its suffices to define directly as our
starting set, the set of sets that we would want to consider.
Also, since nothing prevents two different objects from be-
ing associated with the same set of formulas, it is useless to
consider copies of objects. A drawback of this simple def-
inition is that the notion of classical deduction is lost. The
“entailment” can be highly non standard, departing from
classical logic and natural ways of reasoning. We can e.g.
deduce A ∧ B without deducing A. As a bonus, we can
consider as our starting logic basically any non classical
logic.
If we want to compare the two notions, we must determine
which non standard behavior we admit in the “semantics”
defining the preferential entailment. If we want to extend
KLM entailment in order to deal with any situation acces-
sible to MAK entailment, all we have to do is to admit any
unconstrained relation |≡ between the set of states and the
set of formulas. We can even restrict our attention to the
simplest of the four cases, defining the relation directly on
the set of the objects describing the semantics. Thus, the
interesting point is the other direction. We show that, pro-
vided classical equivalence is respected, MAK entailment
is equivalent to KLM entailment. We describe a simple
subclass of MAK entailment, which includes all the cases
where MAK entailment respects classical equivalence, and
for which it is easy to describe a passage from MAK formu-
lation to KLM formulation and back. We improve previous
results obtained by Dix and Makinson (1992) in [4] and
by Voorbraak (1993) in [13]. With respect to [4], the de-
scription of the subclass of MAK is much simpler. Thanks
to recent results on preferential entailments, we establish
equivalence between the two formalisms in all the cases
where it is possible, namely when MAK respects classical
equivalence.
In Section 2 we introduce the notations and the logical pre-
requisite necessary for this text. In Section 3 we remind the
definitions and main properties of the kind of preferential
entailments considered here, giving our results in Section
4.
2 NOTATIONS AND FRAMEWORK
• L, ϕ, T : We work in a propositional language L, and
we use the same denotation L for its set of formulas. Let-
ters ϕ, ψ denote formulas (identified with their equivalence
class). Letters T or C denote sets of formulas.
• V, M, µ, P(E), µ |= · · ·: V (L) (vocabulary), denotes
a set of propositional symbols and µ denotes an interpre-
tation for L, identified with the subset of V (L) that it sat-
isfies. The satisfaction relation is denoted by |=, µ |= ϕ
and µ |= T being defined classically. For any set E, P(E)
denotes the set of its subsets. The set P(V (L)) of the in-
terpretations for L is denoted by M. A model of T is an
interpretation µ such that µ |= T . The sets of the models
of T and ϕ are denoted respectively by M(T ) and M(ϕ).
• T |= · · · , Th(T ),T: T |= ϕ and T |= T 1 are defined
classically. A theory is a subset of L closed for deduction,
and T denotes the set {T ⊆ L / T = Th(T )} of the
theories of L.
• M1 |= · · · , Th(µ), Th(M1): A theory C ∈ T is complete
if ∀ϕ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ C iff ¬ϕ /∈ C. The set Th(µ) = {ϕ ∈
L / µ |=ϕ} of the formulas satisfied by µ is the theory of
µ. For any subset M1 of M, M1 |= T means µ |= T for
any µ ∈ M1 and the theory of M1 is the set Th(M1) =
{ϕ ∈ L / M1 |= ϕ} [thus Th(M1) =
⋂
µ∈M1
Th(µ)].
This ambiguous use of Th and of |= (applied to sets of
formulas or interpretations) is usual. For any T ∈ T, we
get T =
⋂
Ti∈T, Ti|=T
T i =
⋂
Ci∈T, Ci complete, Ci|=T
Ci.
The set of all the complete theories is in a natural one-to-
one mapping with M: For any µ ∈ M, Th(µ) is complete,
and for any complete C ∈ T, M(C) is a singleton {µ} ⊆ M.
For any T ⊆ L, we get µ |= T iff Th(µ) |= T and for any
M1 ⊆ M, M1 |= T iff Th(M1) |= T .
3 PREFERENTIAL ENTAILMENTS
3.1 PREFERENTIAL KLM ENTAILMENT
Since their introduction [7], these kinds of preferential en-
tailment have been extensively studied. As [4] remarks,
“the use of the term preferential is [..] rather anarchic
[...]”. The situation has not really improved since these
“early years”, however, it is clear that now the word is not
restricted to the “cumulative cases” as done in [7]. The
expression “preferential entailment” was first introduced
by Shoham (1988) in [12], and then regularly generalized
and/or modified. The basic idea however is still the same:
we consider a set of objects describing the semantics, and
a binary relation ≺ on this set of objects. We get a “pref-
erential semantics” in which only the objects, associated
with a set of formulas, which are minimal for ≺, are con-
sidered. The definitions we give can be found in e.g. [7,
Definitions 3.10, 3.13] (“single formula version”) and [6,
Definitions 4.26–29] (“theory version”, only version con-
sidered here), with some modifications which have already
been considered in e.g. [4, 2, 5]. These modifications are
either cosmetic, or consist in dropping some special con-
dition imposed in the original text to the relation ≺, since
(1) we do not need these restrictions, and (2) our study can
accommodate in a straightforward way these restrictions.
Definition 3.1 A KLM model is a triple S = (S, l,≺),
where S is a set, the elements of which are called states,
l is a mapping S → P(M) that labels every state with a set
of interpretations and ≺ is a binary relation on S, called a
preference relation.
We define a satisfaction relation |≡: for any s ∈ S, s|≡ϕ
whenever l(s) |= ϕ and, for any T ⊆ L, s|≡T when-
ever l(s) |= T . For any set of formulas T ⊆ L, we de-
fine S(T ) = {s ∈ S / s|≡T } and the set S≺(T ) of the
states in S(T ) which are minimal for≺ by S≺(T ) = {s ∈
S(T ) / s′ ≺ s for no s′ ∈ S(T )}.
S(T ) is T̂ in the original texts. Notice that, as noted by
Bochman (1999) in [1], we can replace the set l(s) of inter-
pretations by a theory, precisely the theory Th(l(s)), and
we will in fact generally prefer this formulation, where l is
a mapping S → T instead of S → P(M). Also, we drop
here the consistency of states condition l(s) 6= ∅ (or alter-
natively l(s) 6= L if we consider labelling with theories)
which appears in the original definitions. As explained be-
low, this condition is unnecessary.
The role of l is to allow “copies of” sets of interpretations
(or alternatively “copies” of theories), since various states
can be mapped by l to the same object.
Definition 3.2 Let us call an entailment relation, any rela-
tion |∼ in P(L) × L. Any entailment relation can be ex-
tended into a relation in P(L)×P(L) by defining T |∼ T ′
as T |∼ ϕ for any ϕ ∈ T ′.
From any entailment relation, we can define a mapping
C from P(L) to itself, called an entailment, as follows:
C(T ) = {ϕ ∈ L / T |∼ ϕ}.
Definition 3.3 [7] A KLM entailment relation |∼KLM≺ is
defined as follows from a KLM model S: for any T ∪{ϕ} ⊆
L, T |∼KLM≺ ϕ whenever s|≡ϕ for any s ∈ S≺(T ). We
write also ϕ ∈ CKLM (T ) instead of T |∼KLM≺ ϕ and call
the entailment CKLM a KLM preferential entailment, or a
KLM entailment for short.
Definition 3.4 A pre-circumscription f (in L) is an ex-
tensive (i.e., f(T ) ⊇ T for any T ) mapping from T
to T. For any subset T of L, we use the abbreviation
f(T ) = f(Th(T )), assimilating a pre-circumscription
to a particular extensive entailment. We write f(ϕ) for
f({ϕ}) = f(Th(ϕ)).
Thus, we call here pre-circumscription any entailment
which respects full logical equivalence and which is ex-
tensive. By “respects full logical equivalence”, we mean
that, if T 1 and T 2 are two logically equivalent sets of for-
mulas [i.e. Th(T 1) = Th(T 2)], then (1) (“left side”)
f(T 1) = f(T 2), and (2) (“right side”) T 1 ⊆ f(T ) iff
T 2 ⊆ f(T ). The “right side” is equivalent to “right weak-
ening”: if T 1 |= ϕ and T 1 ⊆ f(T ), then ϕ ∈ f(T ).
Definition 3.5 An entailment C satisfies (CT), cumulative
transitivity, also known as “cut”, if
for any T ′ ⊆ C(T ), we get C(T ∪ T ′) ⊆ C(T ).
Here are the two main (and characterizing) properties of
KLM entailments:
Property 3.6 [7, 8] Any KLM entailment CKLM is a pre-
circumscription satisfying (CT).
Property 3.7 [13, 9] Any pre-circumscription satisfying
(CT) is a KLM entailment.
Particular KLM models can be considered. The three kinds
described now originate also from [7], where no special
names are given. Let S = (S, l,≺) be a KLM model.
Definition 3.8 1. If S = P(M) (or equivalently, un-
der the alternative formulation in terms of theories,
S = T) and l = identity, then S is a simplified (or
unlabelled) KLM model.
2. If each l(s) is a singleton in P(M) (or equivalently a
complete theory), then S is a singular KLM model.
3. If S is simplified and singular, then S is a strictly sin-
gular KLM model.
With the unrestricted case, we get then four kinds of mod-
els, which could give rise to four kinds of KLM entail-
ments. It happens ([9], this result could also be extracted
from an independent work by Voorbraak [13]) that we can
without lack of generality restrict our attention to simpli-
fied KLM models: in the proof of Property 3.7, we can
easily get a simplified KLM model. Thus, we do not really
need to use “states” in KLM models. Notice that in the par-
ticular case of a singular KLM model, we generally cannot
suppress the states if we want to keep only singletons in the
image l(S) of l (as shown in a very simple finite example
in [7, p.193], which applies here): we cannot suppress the
states without leaving this attractive particular case1. This
means that if we start from a preference relation defined in
a set of copies of interpretations, we cannot always get an
equivalent relation defined directly on the set M of the in-
terpretations. This feature is a good motivation for using
states, but only in the case of singular models. Also we
cannot express any KLM entailment thanks to a singular
KLM model (a small finite counter-example in [7, proof of
Lemma 4.5] applies here)2. This means that if we start from
a preference relation defined on a set of copies of sets of in-
terpretations (or equivalently of copies of theories), then we
can find an equivalent relation defined directly on the set
P(M) (or T), but we generally cannot define the relation
on the set M of interpretations or even on a set of copies of
interpretations. Thus, we get exactly three kinds of KLM
preferential entailments (see their syntactical characteriza-
tions in [11]), instead of four. A consequence of this re-
duction to simplified models is that any singular model is
equivalent to a simplified model, which is not absolutely
obvious from the definitions (“equivalent”, meaning here
giving rise to the same preferential entailment).
3.2 PREFERENTIAL MAK ENTAILMENT
Makinson considers an entailment more general than its
KLM counterpart, with a simpler definition. The price
is that this notion leaves classical consequence altogether,
getting a highly non standard preferential entailment in
which we can conclude A ∧ B without concluding B, and
in which what we conclude from A ∧ B is not related to
what we conclude from {A,B}. This can be useful if we
want to extend the notion of preferential entailment to non
classical logics. However, if we want to stay in our good
old classical way of reasoning, this is rather confusing. In
1Even in this case, the states can be suppressed, provided we
enlarge the vocabulary of the initial language L in such a way that
each different state gives rise to a different interpretation in the
new language: this method is introduced by Costello (1998) in
[3] for the cumulative and finite case
2Again, this limitation can be overcome [10], at least in the
finite case: at the price of a severe modification of the vocabulary
of the initial language L, any KLM preferential entailment can be
expressed in terms of a strictly singular KLM model.
any case, a fair comparison with KLM definitions needs to
equate the ways we want to reason at first. This is what we
will do in Section 4, after giving the definitions now.
Definition 3.9
[8] A MAK model is a triple S = (S, |≡,≺) where S is
a set, the elements of which are called states, ≺ is a binary
relation on S, called a preference relation (till now, this
is as in KLM models Definition 3.1) and where |≡ is any
satisfaction relation on S. We write s|≡≺ϕ [respectively
s|≡≺T ] whenever s|≡ϕ [respectively s|≡T , i.e. s|≡ϕ for
any ϕ ∈ T ] and for no s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≺ s we have
s′ |≡ϕ [respectively s′ |≡T ].
A MAK entailment relation |∼MAK≺ is defined as follows:
For any set of formulas T ∪ {ϕ}, T |∼MAK≺ ϕ whenever
s|≡ϕ for all s ∈ S satisfying s|≡≺T .
A MAK preferential entailment, or MAK entailment for
short, is an entailment CMAK defined by a MAK entail-
ment relation: CMAK(T ) = {ϕ ∈ L / T |∼MAK≺ ϕ}.
The names KLM model and MAK model are from [4].
What makes this short definition so powerful is that no
condition is required for |≡. This makes the preferential
entailment very different from what we expect for an “en-
tailment”. CMAK is far from being a pre-circumscription:
if T 1 and T 2 are classically equivalent, we do not know
anything about CMAK(T 2) when we know CMAK(T 1).
Moreover, we almost need an extensive description of
all the sets CMAK(T ), since they are not classical theo-
ries. If we drop the identification between a formula and
its equivalence class, we can even consider logics where
CMAK(A ∧ B) is different from CMAK(B ∧ A). It may
even seem strange that such a formalism has interesting
properties, however we get cumulative transitivity:
Property 3.10 [8] Any MAK entailment is extensive and
satisfies (CT).
This implies also idempotence (Makinson, [8]):
CMAK(CMAK(T )) = CMAK(T ). Nevertheless, the sig-
nificance of (CT) for such a non standard “entailment” is
far from being as great as when we deal only with pre-
circumscriptions.
Before making a comparison between MAK and KLM, let
us give a few natural definitions, which extend to (S, |≡)
what is usually done with classical interpretations (M, |=).
Definitions 3.11 Let (S, |≡,≺) be a MAK model. As in
Definition 3.1, for s ∈ S, T ⊆ L, and ϕ ∈ L, s|≡T
means s|≡ϕ for any ϕ∈ T , S(T ) = {s∈ S/s|≡T } [and
S(ϕ) = S({ϕ})].
We define the entailment Cn|≡ as follows: Cn|≡(T ) =
{ϕ ∈ L/ for any s∈S(T ), s|≡ϕ}.
We define also, for each s ∈ S: Cn|≡(s) = {ϕ ∈
L / s|≡ϕ}.
We get (straightforward [4]): Cn|≡ is a Tarski entailment,
i.e. it is an extensive entailment satisfying idempotence
(point 1) and monotony (point 2): for any sets T , T ′ of
formulas,
1. T ⊆ Cn|≡(T ) = Cn|≡(Cn|≡(T )).
2. If T ⊆ T ′ then Cn|≡(T ) ⊆ Cn|≡(T ′).
Notice that we get (immediate from the definitions):
Cn|≡(T ) =
⋂
s∈S(T ) Cn|≡(s).
As a particular case, we get Cn|≡(T ) = L if S(T ) = ∅.
As in classical logic, we use the same notation Cn|≡ for
two different, but closely related, notions (cf Th in Sec-
tion 2): an entailment, defined by Cn|≡(T ), and the no-
tion of “theory of a state”, defined by Cn|≡(s). A justifi-
cation for using the same writing Cn|≡ is that Cn|≡(s) is
indeed a theory in the meaning of Cn|≡: for any s ∈ S,
Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) = Cn|≡(s).
Proof: Cn|≡(s) ⊆ Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) since Cn|≡ is a Tarski
entailment.
Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) =
⋂
s′∈S(Cn|≡(s))
Cn|≡(s
′) by definition
of Cn|≡(T ), and s ∈ S(Cn|≡(s)) [i.e. s|≡Cn|≡(s)], thus
Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) ⊆ Cn|≡(s).
Here is a last result of this kind [4]: For any T ⊆ L, we
get Cn|≡(T ) ⊆ CMAK(T ).
Notice that, contrarily to Cn|≡, CMAK is not a Tarski en-
tailment: it falsifies monotony.
4 RELATING MAK AND KLM
ENTAILMENTS
4.1 THE MAK ENTAILMENTS WHICH ARE KLM
ENTAILMENTS
MAK notion encompasses KLM notion, as noticed in [8,
4]:
Property 4.1 For each KLM model S = (S, l,≺) (defin-
ing a KLM entailment CKLM ), there exists a MAK model
(S, |≡,≺) such that its associated MAK entailment CMAK
is equal to CKLM .
Notice that we even do not need to make l to vanish in the
KLM model (even if we know that we could do so without
loss of generality). The set of states and the preference re-
lation are unmodified. It suffices to define |≡, as in [4], by:
s|≡ϕ whenever l(s) |= ϕ. It is clear from the definitions
that we get indeed |∼MAK≺ =|∼KLM≺ .
What is interesting then is to describe precisely the subclass
of MAK models which can be translated into KLM models.
Here is a characterization of this subclass:
Theorem 4.2 A MAK model S = (S, |≡,≺) gives rise to
a MAK entailment CMAK which is equal to some KLM
entailment CKLM iff the MAK entailment CMAK is a pre-
circumscription.
Proof: The condition is necessary from Property 3.6. MAK
entailments satisfy (CT) from Property 3.10, thus Property
3.7 gives the result.
This shows that what lacks to MAK entailment in order
to be a KLM entailment is exactly the full preservation of
logical equivalence.
Even if this result is satisfactory from a formal perspective,
it is more a characterization of the subclass of the MAK en-
tailments which can be turned into KLM entailments than a
characterization of the subclass of MAK models which can
be turned into KLM models. In some way, this makes no
difference since the preferential entailments are fully de-
fined from the models, but we could expect an easier and
more direct property, which can be checked directly on the
MAK model, without needing to compute its related MAK
entailment.
4.2 A SUBCLASS OF MAK MODELS WHICH
ARE KLM MODELS
The fact that, for any KLM entailment, we have Th(T ) ⊆
CKLM (T ) for any T ⊆ L has already been taken into ac-
count in [4] for describing a subclass of the MAK models
which (1) can be turned into KLM models and (2) is pow-
erful enough to give rise to all the MAK entailments which
are also KLM entailments. However, the description of the
subclass given in [4] is needlessly complex. We describe
here a simpler and more general subclass, which in our
opinion describes all the interesting and non pathological
MAK models which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) above.
Definitions 4.3 1. A MAK model S = (S, |≡,≺) is
supra classical whenever we get Th(Cn|≡(s)) =
Cn|≡(s) for any state s in S. This means that the
“world” associated to each state is classically deduc-
tively closed (i.e. is a classical theory).
2. An entailment C is supra classical if it satisfies
Th(T ) ⊆ C(T ) for any T ⊆ L.
The first definition concerns only the couple (S, |≡) de-
scribing the semantics to which ≺ will be applied, but is
independent of the preference relation ≺. Voorbraak [13]
calls “L-faithful” what we call supra classical models.
For the second definition, notice that any pre-circum-
scription is a supra classical entailment.
Lemma 4.4 If a MAK model S = (S, |≡,≺) is such that
the entailment Cn|≡ is supra classical, then the MAK
model S is supra classical.
Proof: (1) Cn|≡(s) ⊆ Th(Cn|≡(s)) since T ⊆ Th(T ).
(2) Th(Cn|≡(s)) ⊆ Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) by hypothesis, and we
already know that we have in any case Cn|≡(Cn|≡(s)) =
Cn|≡(s), which establishes Th(Cn|≡(s)) = Cn|≡(s).
Lemma 4.5 If a MAK model S = (S, |≡,≺) is supra
classical, then the (Tarski) entailment Cn|≡ and the (pref-
erential) MAK entailment CMAK defined by S are pre-
circumscriptions.
Proof: (1) Let ϕ ∈ Th(T ) and s ∈ S(T ), i.e. T ⊆
Cn|≡(s), then ϕ ∈ Cn|≡(s) by supra classicality of S.
Thus, ϕ ∈
⋂
s∈S(T ) Cn|≡(s), i.e. ϕ ∈ Cn|≡(T ): Cn|≡
is supra classical. From Cn|≡(T ) =
⋂
s∈S(T ) Cn|≡(s) we
get also Cn|≡(T ) ∈ T since each Cn|≡(s) is in T. Since
by Definition 3.9 we get CMAK(T ) =
⋂
s∈S≺(T )
Cn|≡(s)
(where the subset S≺(T ) of S(T ) is defined exactly as in
Definition 3.1 for KLM models), we get a fortiori ϕ ∈
CMAK(T ) ∈ T.
(2) If T 1 and T 2 are two equivalent sets, then, by supra
classicality of S, for each s ∈ S, we have s|≡T 1 iff s|≡T 2,
i.e. we have S(T 1) = S(T 2). A fortiori we get then
S≺(T 1) = S≺(T 2). Thus we get Cn|≡(T 1) = Cn|≡(T 2)
and CMAK(T 1) = CMAK(T 2) by the definitions of
Cn|≡(T ) and CMAK(T ) respectively.
We have established:
Property 4.6 1. A MAK model S=(S, |≡,≺) is supra
classical iff the (Tarski) entailment Cn|≡ that it de-
fines is supra classical, iff the entailment Cn|≡ is a
pre-circumscription.
2. If a MAK model is supra classical, then the (prefer-
ential) MAK entailment CMAK that it determines is a
pre-circumscription.
We are now in position to establish our second main result:
Theorem 4.7 1. If a MAK model S is supra classical,
then the MAK entailment CMAK that it determines is
equal to some KLM entailment CKLM .
Precisely, if S = (S, |≡,≺) is supra classical, then
there exists a KLM model S′ = (S, l,≺) with S and≺
unmodified, such that the MAK entailment defined by
S is the KLM entailment defined by S′.
2. Any KLM preferential entailment CKLM is equal to
a MAK entailment defined by a supra classical MAK
model.
Precisely, if S = (S, l,≺), then there exists a supra
classical MAK model S′ = (S, |≡,≺) with S and ≺
unmodified, such that the KLM entailment defined by
S is the MAK entailment defined by S′.
Proof: (1) Theorem 4.2 and Property 4.6-2 give the first
sentence.
Let S = (S, |≡,≺) be a supra classical MAK model. We
get a KLM model as follows: we keep the set S and the
relation ≺ unmodified. We define l as the mapping S → T
by taking l(s) = Cn|≡(s). It is immediate to see that the
KLM entailment CKLM is equal to CMAK .
(2) We have a constructive proof already: It suffices to see
the construction given in Property 4.1: it is clear from the
definitions that the MAK model obtained there is supra
classical since we have already noticed that each l(s) in
Definition 3.1 can be equated to a classical theory. Notice
that this theorem could also have been obtained as a con-
sequence of some results in an earlier independent work
by Voorbraak [13]. Rather strangely, Voorbraak does not
enounce this result in all generality, referring to [4] for fur-
ther results on the subject.
Thus, we get characterization results and constructive pas-
sages simpler and easier than those given in [4]. However,
our results are slightly more general (see why in note 4):
the subclass of the MAK models considered here is slightly
greater than the subclass considered by Dix and Makin-
son since they consider a strict subclass of the MAK mod-
els which can be “amplified” (in their terms). It is easy
to see, from [4] together with our results, that the class
of the MAK models which can be “amplified” coincide
with the class of the supra classical MAK models. More-
over, our comparison does not need to consider a third in-
termediate (between Cn|≡ and CMAK ) non classical en-
tailment3, which plays an important role in the results of
[4], but which complicates the direct comparison between
KLM and MAK preferential entailments. This simplifica-
tion comes mainly from our results about supra classical
MAK models. And the condition that each Cn|≡(s) must
be a theory is easily checked, without the need to compute
the associated MAK entailment or to introduce a third non
classical entailment.
3For readers familiar with [4], let us notice that an immediate
consequence of our results is that, even in the exact framework
and formulation considered in [4, main theorem], the condition
(3a) given there (s|≡ϕ and s|≡ϕ′ implies s|≡ϕ∧ϕ′) is redundant.
One consequence of our results about MAK entailments is
that, if we are concerned only by those MAK entailments
which respect full logical equivalence, then we can restrict
our attention to a yet narrower class of MAK models. In-
deed, we have seen just above why in this case we can re-
strict our attention to the easily described class of supra
classical MAK models. Now, since we know that, for KLM
entailments, we can consider only the simplified version
of KLM models, our passages between MAK models and
KLM models show that we can also require a unicity of
states condition for MAK models. By “unicity of states”,
we mean that, for any different s, s′ ∈ S, the “worlds”
Cn|≡(s) and Cn|≡(s′) corresponding to these two states
are different. The class of the supra classical MAK models
satisfying unicity of states is powerful enough to generate
all the MAK entailments which are pre-circumscriptions.
Let us describe briefly now the analogous of the singular
and the strictly singular KLM models in terms of MAK
models.
Definition 4.8 A MAK model S = (S, |≡,≺) is classical
if the “worlds” Cn|≡(s) are (classical) complete theories,
for any state s in S.
Remark 4.9 • A MAK model is supra classical iff the sat-
isfaction relation |≡ respects the binary connector ∧: for
each s ∈ S, we have
s|≡ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff s|≡ϕ1 and s|≡ϕ2. (R∧)
• • A MAK model is classical iff it is supra classical and
|≡ respects the negation ¬:
s|6≡ ϕ iff s|≡¬ϕ. (R¬)
Proof: • If each Cn|≡(s) is in T, then, since {ϕ1, ϕ2} ≡
{ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2}, we get {ϕ1, ϕ2} ⊆ Cn|≡(s) iff {ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2} ⊆
Cn|≡(s). Conversely, let us suppose (R∧). Then, if
{ϕi}∈I ⊆ Cn|≡(s) and {ϕi}i∈I |= ϕ, by compactness
of |= there exists a finite J ⊆ I such that {ϕi}i∈J |= ϕ,
i.e.
∧
i∈J ϕi |= ϕ, i.e.
∧
i∈J ϕi ≡ (
∧
i∈J ϕi) ∧ ϕ, thus,
by (R∧), ϕ ∈ Cn|≡(s). Remind that we identify a for-
mula with its equivalence class. Makinson does not always
make this assumption in [8], thus, his original formalism is
slightly more general than the version given in the present
text. However, since with KLM entailments a formula can
always be replaced by an equivalent formula, we have to
make this assumption (or any equivalent one) when we
want to compare the two formalisms. This means that if
this assumption is not made till the beginning (as in this
text), then it must be added, e.g. by requiring in Definition
4.3-1 that |= is standard. Notice that Definition 4.3-1 as
it stands implies that two formulas equivalent (for |=) are
always in the same sets Cn|≡(s), thus are “equivalent for
|≡”.
• • A theory Cn|≡(s) is complete iff [ϕ ∈ Cn|≡(s) iff
¬ϕ /∈ Cn|≡(s)], i.e. iff |≡ satisfies (R¬).
A MAK model is classical iff |≡ respects all the logical
connectors. For instance, it is immediate to see that (R∧)
and (R¬) imply (R∨):
s|≡ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff s|≡ϕ1 or s|≡ϕ2. (R∨)
Classical MAK models correspond to singular KLM mod-
els while the classical MAK models which respect unicity
of states correspond to the strictly singular KLM models.
4.3 COMING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL KLM
ENTAILMENTS
This work applies also to cases where special conditions are
required for the models. We think that the simplicity and
the naturalness of our translation is a first serious indication
for this. Let us consider the original definitions.
Definitions 4.10 1. A consistent KLM model, is such
that each state is consistent, meaning that l(s) is con-
sistent.
2. A KLM model S = (S, l,≺) is smooth (stoppered in
[8]) if, for each T ⊆ L and s ∈ S(T )−S≺(T ), there
exists s′ ∈ S≺(T ) such that s′ ≺ s (“minoration by a
minimal state”).
[7] considers only the KLM models which are consistent
and smooth. The authors consider that the “converse of
(CT)” [if T ′ ⊆ C(T ), thenC(T ) ⊆ C(T ∪T ′)], called cu-
mulative monotony (CM), is as important as (CT), and they
only care of cumulative entailments, which satisfy (CT)
and (CM). They give the following characterization:
Original KLM characterization [7]:
A pre-circumscription C is cumulative iff it is a KLM en-
tailment defined by a smooth and consistent KLM model.
It happens that this characterization result also holds with-
out the consistency condition, which confirms our opinion
made after Definition 3.1 that, for KLM entailments, the
requirement that l(s) must be consistent is needless4.
4For readers familiar with [4], let us remind that Dix and
Makinson add to (3a) (see note 3) a “consistency of states” con-
dition (3b), for the MAK models, in their main theorem. This
condition is necessary in their text only because they disallow
inconsistent states in KLM models, following [7]. Since incon-
sistent states are not a real problem, this condition, which re-
stricts slightly the class of the MAK models concerned, can be
suppressed without modifying the results about the preferential
entailments.
We get, with the KLM models as defined here, a first mod-
ification of KLM characterization:
A “KLM Characterization” allowing inconsistent
states: A pre-circumscription C is cumulative iff it is a
KLM entailment defined by a smooth KLM model.
The proof is an easy modification of the proof of the orig-
inal characterization [7], moreover this result has already
appeared as [8, Observation 3.4.5] and [13, Proposition
5.4].
We can go even further, by requiring that the KLM model is
a simplified KLM model, meaning an “unlabelled model”,
or a “model without states”: S = T and l = identity.
A “KLM Characterization” with simplified models:
A pre circumscription C is cumulative iff it is a KLM en-
tailment defined by a smooth simplified KLM model.
Indeed, the “if” side comes from the “if” side of the pre-
vious characterization, allowing inconsistent states. For
the “only if” side, it suffices to define the simplified KLM
model associated to C as follows:
(1) S = T, l = identity (the model is simplified, no need
for states).
(2) For T 1, T 2 in T, T 1 ≺C T 2 iff
(2a) T 1 = L and T 2 6= f(T ) for any T ∈ T, or
(2b) T 2 6= L, T 2 6= T 1 and there exists T 3, T 4
in T such that f(T 3) = T 1, f(T 4) = T 2,
and T 3 ⊆ T 2.
Then, if C is a cumulative pre-circumscription, an easy
translation of the proof of the characterization result from
[7] (where l is injective, as also taken into account in a
“suppression of states” result given in [1]) shows that we
get, in a way very similar to the original proof of [7]:
(1) C is equal to the KLM entailment defined by
this simplified KLM model, and
(2) this [simplified] KLM model is smooth
(and irreflexive).
Notice that this result has also appeared as [13, Proposition
5.5], with an apparently different proof.
We can then get immediately the corresponding character-
ization results in terms of MAK entailment, by using The-
orems 4.2 and 4.7.
5 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have shown that the notions of preferential entailment
as defined by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and as defined
by Makinson are much closely related than was supposed
before. Indeed, these two notions coincide exactly in all
the cases where they can coincide, that is when the under-
lying logic respects classical equivalence. Moreover, we
have shown that a similar result holds also for the respec-
tive models defining the two notions. It was already known
that any KLM model could easily be turned into a MAK
model. We have exhibited a natural subclass of the MAK
models which can, exactly as easily, be turned into a KLM
model. The subclass obtained here is slightly greater, and is
much easier to describe, than what was previously known.
And this subclass of models is “complete”: it generates all
the KLM preferential entailments. This subclass is the class
of the MAK models for which all the states have a “clas-
sical” behavior: the set of formulas they satisfy is closed
for classical deduction. This subclass is the most natural
class to consider. Indeed, this is the class such that, for any
preference relation ≺, we are certain from the beginning
that the MAK preferential entailment generated has a clas-
sical behavior with respect to logical equivalence. There
exist some MAK models outside this class which give rise
to a KLM entailment, but these models are rather special,
since it turns out that their preference relation, in some way,
eliminates all the states in the model with an unclassical be-
havior. We have also shown that our results apply to impor-
tant particular subclasses of KLM models and MAK mod-
els, namely those which are simplified in that either the la-
belling mapping l is needless [KLM side], or some “unicity
of state” condition is required [MAK side]. And we have
shown that, even for the cumulative entailments considered
in the original texts, these simplified models suffice, and
that the passages between KLM models and MAK models
work in this case also. As (non trivial) future work, let us
remark that these results should help further study on the
subject, since they show that this kind of preferential en-
tailment is not as “cumbersome” as it is qualified even in
the founding paper [7]. Even automatic computation could
take advantage from these results, since the models consid-
ered here have nice properties, which, hopefully, could help
designing new kinds of “preferential entailments demon-
strators”.
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